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THE LUXURY OF THE LAW: THE
CODIFICATION MOVEMENT AND THE RIGHT
TO COUNSEL
Norman W. Spaulding*
Professor Deborah Rhode's Access to Justice offers a rich and
provocative set of arguments for making the legal system more open
and responsive to low- and middle-income Americans. Perhaps the
most compelling aspect of the book is its encyclopedic collection of
data revealing a wide gap between our ideals-expressed in
constitutional mandates, popular platitudes about equal justice for all,
and our sense of superiority as a constitutional democracy committed
to the rule of law-and the abysmal services available to average
Americans when they turn to law. As she has done many times
before, Professor Rhode enters a field and defines and dominates it by
the sheer breadth of her fact-gathering and analysis. Her presentation
is clear and forceful, inviting both legal and nonlegal audiences to
engage the question of how to ensure access to justice.
The descriptive work of the book alone makes an invaluable
contribution to the literature on the adversary system, access to legal
services, and professional ethics. But the book also should have an
impact outside legal academic circles as a corrective to popular
misconceptions about American litigation. As Professor Rhode
forcefully argues, sensationalist press coverage and a steady barrage
of conservative attacks on "greedy" trial lawyers and "excessive"
consumer litigation have fostered distinctly counterfactual perceptions
about the adversary system and the interests it serves. Television and
print media, stump speeches, and a vast array of internet sites
regularly enjoin us to worry about excessive jury awards even though
"juries are no more likely than judges to be swayed by sympathy for
injured victims and to award punitive damages," and "the vast
majority of tort victims are undercompensated, not
overcompensated."1  We are further encouraged to worry about
runaway punitive damage awards and excessive consumer litigation
* Visiting Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. J.D., 1997, Stanford Law School;
B.A., 1993, Williams College.
1. Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice 30, 40 (2004) (emphasis added); see also
id. at 33 ("[M]edia coverage that disproportionately focuses on huge damage awards
encourages... skewed perceptions. Cases reported by the press have verdicts
between four and twenty times larger than the average.").
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even though punitive damages "occur in only about 4 percent of cases
that plaintiffs win in court," and "disputes between businesses are the
largest and fastest growing category of civil litigation";2 to worry
about tort litigation hampering the competitiveness of American
enterprise even though studies estimate "that tort liability could
represent no more than 2 percent of the total expense of United
States goods and services, an amount 'highly unlikely' to have a
substantial effect on American competitiveness"; 3 and to worry about
slick criminal defense lawyers tricking juries into acquitting guilty but
rich defendants even though "[o]ver 90 percent of cases are resolved
by guilty pleas, generally without any factual investigation... [and in]
the small minority of cases that go to trial, convictions have been
upheld where defense counsel were asleep, on drugs, suffering from
mental illness, or parking their cars during key parts of the
prosecution's case."4  Each of these messages distorts public
awareness of deeper and far more disquieting facts about the failure
of American civil and criminal law to meet basic standards of decency
and fairness for low- and middle-income people.
It is impossible to solve a problem we don't even recognize, and, as
Professor Rhode contends, for the last twenty years misperceptions
have driven "reforms" that arguably exacerbate the problem.5 Access
to Justice thus offers a roadmap for improving not only the quality and
distribution of legal services, but the terms of public and professional
debate that determine the content of reforms.
I. THE CODIFICATION MOVEMENT-AMERICA'S FIRST FAILED
REVOLUTION IN ACCESS TO LAW
The terms of public and professional debate, indeed the entire
reform agenda on access to law, had a dramatically different valence
2. See id. at 30; see also id. at 29.
Current litigation rates in the United States are not exceptionally high,
either in comparison with prior eras or with many other Western industrial
nations not known for contentiousness. Americans were more likely to sue a
century ago than they are now. Court filings in the United States now are in
the same range, when adjusted for population, as those in Canada, Australia,
New Zealand, England, and Denmark.
Id.
3. Id. at 32; see also id.
Other estimates suggest that businesses' total liability for all legal claims,
including torts, is about 25 cents for every 100 dollars in revenue. Given
these modest costs, it is not surprising that corporate risk managers have
reported relatively little adverse effect from liability on larger economic
indicators such as gross revenues or market share. In managers' experience,
the major impact of tort claims has been to improve product safety and
warning efforts.
Id.
4. Id. at 4; see also id. at 122-44.
5. See, for example, her discussion of the funding and positional constraints
imposed on federally subsidized legal aid attorneys. Id. at 61-64, 108-10.
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for much of the nineteenth century. Egalitarians of the period were,
in a sense, more ambitious, more politically powerful, and less
deferential to the profession than their modern counterparts. Rather
than demand subsidized access to lawyers, they sought direct access to
law through "codification." But we miss the most dynamic aspects of
this movement for legal reform if we concentrate exclusively on the
right to counsel-as Professor Rhode rightly observes, charitable and
publicly subsidized legal aid for criminal defendants and civil litigants
are of fairly recent origin.6
To modern lawyers, codification calls forth images of technical
drafting undertaken by legislators and expert advisory committees.
As the restatements and uniform codes indicate, codification purports
to offer guidance and provide a foundation for uniformity and
generality in law. But the result is often hopelessly obtuse statutory
language or unenforceable recapitulations of law only a specialist can
decipher.
It was not always so. In the nineteenth century, codification
represented a democratic movement for access to justice-for
reforming the legal system so that laypersons could not only
understand, but operate, the machinery of law. In its strongest form,
it presented a direct threat to the legal profession, to judicial
authority, and to the doctrine of common law reception. A perfect
legal code would require no intermediaries, no self-appointed class of
authoritative interpreters, between law and the people. And with
precedent and practice reduced to principle, everyone could know the
law and everyone could be his own lawyer.
The politically operative form of codification was less utopian, and
was led by lawyers who embraced the democratic impulses animating
the movement, but by no means believed it should eliminate the
bench and bar.7 Their focus was on reducing the expense, delay,
excessive formality, and confusion of common law litigation, not doing
6. See id. at 47-78. Poor and low-income Americans had no affirmative right to
legal assistance in the nineteenth century, so if they received help from lawyers, it was
usually by professional grace. The extent of pro bono service in the nineteenth
century is impossible to measure, but there was ample incentive for young lawyers to
take litigation work for free, especially criminal cases or other trial work likely to
attract public attention and, thereafter, paying clients. Still, it is unlikely that the
supply of pro bono service met demand even when combined with legal services
offered by lay practitioners under the lax unauthorized practice laws of the period.
7. See, e.g., Thomas Smith Grimke, An Oration of the Practicability and
Expedience of Reducing the Whole Body of the Law to the Simplicity of a Code,
Address to the South Carolina Bar Association (Mar. 17, 1827), in The Legal Mind in
America: From Independence to the Civil War 147, 150, 158 (Perry Miller ed., 1962)
[hereinafter The Legal Mind in America] ("[B]eyond question, the era never can
arrive, when every man will be his own Lawyer."). Indeed, there is evidence that
these lawyers hoped codification would help improve the standing of the profession.
Id. at 156; see also David Dudley Field, Study and Practice of the Law, in Speeches,
Arguments, and Miscellaneous Papers of David Dudley Field 484, 490 (A.P. Sprague
ed., 1884) [hereinafter David Dudley Field].
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away with lawyers and adjudication.8 Arguing in 1824 that the
common law was a "pagan idol" and that "[w]e must either be
governed by laws made for us, or made by us,"9 William Sampson, an
Irish refugee and early supporter of codification, believed that
[w]e should have had laws suited to our condition and high
destinies .... No longer forced into the degrading paths of Norman
subtleties, nor to copy from models of Saxon barbarity, but taught to
resolve every argument into principles of natural reason, universal
justice, and present convenience, truth would [be] the constant
object of [lawyers'] search; chicane and pettifogging would have ...
no dark crevices to lurk in... good sense would not be shocked with
the failures of right, upon execution of idle and unmeaning form;
and Justice would not be seen forever traveling upon bypaths .. .1
Simplicity and accessibility, Sampson insisted, are essential to the
legitimacy of law in a democratic society: "The efficacy of the law
depends on the confidence it creates, and it never will inspire so much
confidence, as when it lays aside the veil of mystery, and presents
itself in all the simple majesty of truth."'1 Codification, he believed,
would bring both simplicity and accessibility, restoring public faith in
law "as a human, not a preternatural institution," and opening the way
for progress in the science of jurisprudence beyond the feudal morass
of common law doctrine:
[The law's] defects will be excused, its excellencies acknowledged,
and what is most desirable, it will advance with a free and
unimpeded step towards perfection. Its stubborn forms will be
taught to bend to the convenience and exigencies of the people for
whose use it subsists. It will be separated from the rubbish and
decay of time, and stripped of the parasitical growths that darken
and disfigure it.1 2
Much of the problem, Sampson and others argued, was excessive
reverence among lawyers for English common law. "[W]e should
import no more," he insisted, for English judges "are not fit persons to
8. See David Dudley Field, First Principles of Reform, in David Dudley Field,
supra note 7, at 225 ("These champions of things as they are... by no means
represent the majority of the profession; with the larger body of lawyers, the opinion
is very prevalent-an opinion that gains ground every day-that the present system is
unreasonably arbitrary, dilatory, and expensive."); see also Daun Van Ee, David
Dudley Field and the Reconstruction of the Law (1974).
9. William Sampson, Showing the Origin, Progress, Antiquities, Curiosities, and
the Nature of the Common Law, Anniversary Discourse Before the Historical Society
of New York (Dec. 6,1823), in The Legal Mind in America, supra note 7, at 119, 123,
126. On Sampson's life and role in the codification movement, see Maxwell
Bloomfield, American Lawyers in a Changing Society 1776-1876, at 59 (1976).
10. Sampson, supra note 9, at 125; see also Robert Rantoul, Jr., Oration at
Scituate (July 4, 1836), in The Legal Mind in America, supra note 7, at 222 ("The
Common Law had its origin in folly, barbarism, and feudality.").
11. Sampson, supra note 9, at 122.
12. Id.
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legislate for us.... Must we tread always in their steps, go where they
go, be what they are, do what they do, and say what they say? ... If
we can only be wise when they are wise, we must also be foolish if
they are foolish.... ,,3  Common law reception also dangerously
inflated the power of the judiciary in America. With codification, by
contrast, "[plarticular cases will not.., be resorted to instead of
general law. The law will govern the decisions of judges, and not the
decisions the law."' 4  And once defined by principle rather than
precedent, "[o]ur jurisprudence then will be no longer intricate and
thorny; nor will it need those fictions, which give it the air of occult
magic, or those queer and awkward contrivances, which, by rendering
it ridiculous, greatly diminish its dignity and efficacy." 5  The
profession would finally "be delivered from those odious volumes of
special pleading," the bane of nineteenth century trial practice,
where the suitor's story is told in twenty different ways, and
answered in as many, and must be hunted for with fear and
trembling in printed books.., and made conformable to precedents
composed before the party was in being, and which, in no one single
instance, conform to the truth: insomuch, that he who dares to tell
his case according to the simple and honest truth, will for that very
reason. . . fail in his suit.16
Lawyers, he predicted, would rise in public esteem. 7
Twenty years later, Timothy Walker, a prominent Cincinnati
lawyer, treatise writer, and disciple of Joseph Story, echoed
Sampson's views on the folly and antidemocratic logic of common law
reception. "[T]he whole body of common law," he insisted in a report
published in the Western Law Journal, "is the vast work of Judicial
Legislation.... Accordingly it may happen that the rights of an
American citizen, in the nineteenth century, will depend upon the
13. Id. at 128-29.
14. Id. at 132; see also id. at 128 ("It is the meagreness and insufficiency of this
ancient stock, that has obliged judges to legislate pro re nata [with respect to each
thing as it appears], upon every new point."). As Robert Rantoul put it: "Judge-
made law is ex post facto law, and therefore unjust.... Judge-made law is special
legislation. The judge is human, and feels the bias which the coloring of the particular
case gives. If he wishes to decide the next case differently, he has only to distinguish,
and thereby make a new law." Rantoul, supra note 10, at 223; see also id. at 224 ("The
judge makes law, by extorting from precedents something which they do not contain.
He extends his precedents, which were themselves the extension of others, till ... a
whole system of law is built up without the authority or interference of the
legislator."); id. at 223, 225 ("The legislature must act on general views, and prescribe
at once for a whole class of cases.... Statutes, enacted by the legislature, speak the
public voice.").
15. Sampson, supra note 9, at 132.
16. Id. (emphasis added).
17. See id. at 125.
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opinion of a British judge, pronounced in the tenth century." 8 More
troublingly, adaptation of British precedents circumvented popular
ratification of law, "[s]o that the question, what is the law of Ohio, can
only be answered by saying, that it is what our judges please to
determine." 9 If law is indeed a science, he continued, it should be
possible to "arrange [its principles] into a system, and give them a
legislative sanction," so that law is known, certain, accessible, and "in
harmony ... with the general spirit of our institutions. '2 Lawyers
oppose codification, he lamented, because "[t]hey are the most
directly interested in keeping things as they are" and because they
have been taught to revere the "time-hallowed mysteries" of
precedent.2 American law, he wrote in an 1848 essay, "must be
redeemed from the well deserved charge of excessive technicality,"22
and Walker pushed for the profession to lead the way in reform. 3
As Sampson and Walker's writings suggest, the ideological roots of
the codification movement were radically egalitarian, tapping into
longstanding ambivalence about the growing power and aristocratic
pretensions of the legal profession, as well as hostility to the project of
shaping American law by borrowing common law doctrines from the
country's colonial oppressor rather than deferring to democratically
18. Timothy Walker, Codification -Its Practicability and Expediency -Being a
Report Made to the Cincinnati Legislative Club, in 1835, 1 W. L.J. 433, 435 (1844); see
also Walter Theodore Hitchcock, Timothy Walker: Antebellum Lawyer (1990).
19. Walker, supra note 18, at 436.
20. Id. at 436, 438.
21. Id. at 433-34; see also Charles P. James, Lawyers and Their Traits, An Address
Delivered Before the Law School of Cincinnati College, 9 W. L.J. 49, 55 (1851)
(arguing that common law precedents do not fit the present and that lawyers must be
emancipated from "servitude to obsolete things"). James argued that because the
common law protected barons as a class, lawyers relied on complexity and
"unintelligible circuity... [to] circumvent[] the political power of the great
landholders .... [The lawyers] were obliged to practice as a virtue the faculty of
tortuous and subtle interpretation. Since nothing but a tangled net would bind the
sleeping lion, they learned the poor art of weaving such a mesh." Id. at 52-54; id. at 63
(complexity, absurdity, technicality of common law, and conservatism of the bar are
not an inherent tendency in legal science, "but the stooping of the shoulder which has
borne too heavy a burden"); id. at 57 (arguing that lawyers should be "part and parcel
of the people.... It is through him, chiefly, that the wants of society are to become
known to judges, and recognized in judgment" and that this cannot happen if he "sets
himself apart from.. . society" into "a separate order").
22. Timothy Walker, Law Reform-Procedure, 5 W. L.J. 337,341 (1848).
23. In a letter endorsing the Field Code, Timothy Walker wrote the following:
I have long regarded the existing system as a monstrous abuse. Did it ever
occur to you to attempt an estimate of the proportion of cases which turned
upon a mere technicality, without reaching the merits? I believe you would
find it more than half. Again, did you ever consider that, in order to become
an adroit pleader and practitioner, you must give much more to the study of
forms, than of principles? Now these ought no longer so to be.
Timothy Walker, Kentucky Convention-Codification-Law Reform, 7 W. L.J. 199,
217 (1850).
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elected legislators. 4 Henry Dwight Sedgwick, a New York lawyer,
was even more blunt in linking law reform to the ideal of equal access
to justice:
Americans will not long believe, and the inhabitants of many of
these states do not now believe, that there is any necessity that the
forms of conducting a legal controversy should be so multiplied and
expensive, that the mere costs of suit, without taking into
consideration the rewards of professional eminence, should be so
great, that none but the rich can indulge in the luxury of the law.25
Radical nonlawyer reformers went further still, insisting that in a true
democracy, lawyers, if not law itself, should be unnecessary. Rights
would be sedulously observed, liberties openly enjoyed, and order
self-enforcing. 6
Codification thus reflected several distinct strains of political
thought and action. Jeffersonian Republicans at the turn of the
eighteenth to nineteenth century, and later Jacksonian Democrats,
viewed the bench and bar, and their support for common law
reception, as fundamentally undemocratic-popularly elected and
accountable legislatures were authoritative lawmakers in a democratic
society, not the judiciary. Classical republicanism assumed that an
enlightened, virtuous citizenry would both understand and protect the
general welfare. For Jeffersonians and Jacksonians, the revised
republicanism of Federalists and Whigs, which doubted the wisdom
and virtue of the people and placed authority in a supposedly virtuous
24. As one historian has written:
While a residue of sentiment against the supposedly Anglophilic lawyer
remained at the beginning of Jefferson's presidency, the attack, by then, had
shifted ground markedly. No longer were lawyers trained at the English
Inns; nor was their work primarily the thankless task of collecting wartime
debts. Their offensiveness, it was discovered, came instead from their
attempts to entrench themselves as a professional aristocracy, fattening their
purses at the people's expense. In the demagogic idiom they were parasitical
and superfluous agents who had arrogated an important democratic
function -the administration of justice.
Gary Nash, The Philadelphia Bench and Bar, 1800-1861, 7 Comp. Stud. in Soc'y &
Hist. 203, 210 (1965); id. at 210-14 (detailing radical democratic assault on the legal
profession in Pennsylvania); see also Anon., Bar Associations, 4 So. Lit. Msgr. 583
(1838) (complaining that bar associations are "odious" monopolies and that "[m]en
cannot investigate their rights, or pursue them, when ascertained, without the aid of
the bar").
25. Henry Dwight Sedgwick, Showing the Origin, Progress, Antiquities,
Curiosities, and Nature of the Common Law, Anniversary Discourse Before the
Historical Society of New York (Dec. 6 1823), in The Legal Mind in America, supra
note 7, at 145-46.
26. For examples of anti-lawyer sentiment, see P. W. Grayson, Vice Unmasked, an
Essay: Being a Consideration of the Influence of Law Upon the Moral Essence of
Man, with Other Reflections, in The Legal Mind in America, supra note 7, at 191, and
more generally, see Bloomfield, supra note 9, at 32. Cf. Alexis De Tocqueville, 1
Democracy in America 272-80 (Henry Reeve trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1862)
(1835) (arguing that lawyers are a necessary mediating force).
2004]
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class of elites, was anathema. Popular sovereignty, they argued, is
meaningless if common law doctrines propounded by lawyers and
judges subvert legislative enactments, insulate privilege, and forestall
innovation.27  The writings of Jeremy Bentham and the Code
Napoleon in France also offered precedent and inspiration for using
the science of jurisprudence to reduce law to its most basic
principles-to simplify law and render it more accessible.2" And
natural law theory provided reformers a foundation for arguing that
anyone capable of reasoning could understand and apply legal
principles, that a special class of experts was not only undesirable, but
also unnecessary.29
Conservative lawyers saw the threat in codification and mounted a
vigorous opposition campaign. They attacked codification as
unwarranted and impracticable,3" defended the common law as a form
of organic communal wisdom that could never be matched by even
the wisest legislature,31 and promoted a consoling image of the lawyer
as a hardworking and "benevolently neutral technocrat" to counter
charges of greed, megalomania, and antidemocratic elitism.32 The
ensuing struggle spanned most of the century, culminating in the well-
known clashes between David Dudley Field and James Coolidge
27. See Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution
(1967); Charles M. Cook, The American Codification Movement: A Study of
Antebellum Legal Reform (1981); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson
(1946); Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American
Enterprise, 1870-1920, in Professions and Professional Ideologies in America 70, 83-87
(Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983).
28. On the influence of the Code Napoleon, see Bloomfield, supra note 9, at 69.
See also Cook, supra note 27, at 72-73. On Bentham's influence, see id. at 97-105.
29. Gordon, supra note 27; cf Jesse Root, The Origin of Government and Laws in
Connecticut 1798, in The Legal Mind in America, supra note 7, at 33-35 (arguing that
domestic common law is derived from "the law of nature" and the "perfection of
reason," not English doctrine and supporting codification).
30. See Elijah Paine, Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Circuit Court
of the United States, for the Second Circuit, 60 N. Am. Rev. 167 (1828); see also Cook,
supra note 27, at 110-18 (describing views of anti-reformers).
31. As Peter Du Ponceau insisted:
But admitting that this country possesses superior legislative talents to any
other, I assert, without the fear of contradiction, that it is impossible to
abolish the Common Law. Make as many codes as you will, this second
nature will still force itself upon you: Expellas furca tamen usque recurret
[Expel it with a pitchfork, nevertheless it will forever rush back] .... We
should still recur to it for principles and illustrations, and it would rise
triumphant above its own ruins, deriding and defying its impotent enemies.
Peter Du Ponceau, A Dissertation on the Nature and Extent of the Jurisdiction
of the Courts of the United States, Valedictory Address Delivered to the
Students of the Law Academy of Philadelphia, at the Close of the Academic
Year (Apr. 22, 1824), in The Legal Mind in America, supra note 7, at 113.
32. Bloomfield, supra note 9, at 142.
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Carter.33 By all accounts, the conservative bar succeeded in stifling
the more radical ambitions of the codification movement and in co-
opting its practical agenda. David Dudley Field's 1848 code of
procedure in New York became a template for procedural reform in
many other states (particularly in the West) and attempts at drafting
and implementing substantive law codes met with some success. But
the bench and bar controlled many of these reforms, either by taking
charge of the drafting process or complicating new codes by securing
amendments after passage and adding judicial gloss and precedent to
the interpretation of code language through subsequent litigation.34
The turn to legal aid and arguments for an affirmative right to
counsel in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century can thus be
seen in part as a response to defeat in the larger battle to reform law
itself and make it directly accessible to the people. Conservative legal
elites, to put it differently, forced reformers to settle for lawyers-to
settle for a reform agenda that concentrated heavily on expanding
access to counsel.
The forced compromise has held. Today, American concepts of
due process and access to justice are exceedingly lawyer-centric and
deeply rooted in values derived from the adversary system.35 Even
critiques and imagined alternatives to the adversary system tend to
reason backward from its defining features rather than beginning from
genuinely new premises about access to justice and the proper sources
of law. Modern reformers speak of permitting substitutes and
competition for full-blown legal representation, and of turning lay
people into good lawyers for themselves, not fundamentally altering
the relationship of low- and middle-income people to the law.
There are several reasons for this reification of adjudicatory law.
First, the stark difference that having a lawyer, especially a good
lawyer, makes for corporations and individuals who can afford one
draws the energy and attention of liberal reform efforts to the issue of
representation-getting good legal help for those who cannot afford
it. Second, the primary constituency of liberal reformers today is
disenfranchised minorities, groups who cannot even begin to wield the
kind of political power in legislatures that antebellum reformers
(speaking then for a newly enfranchised white, male working class
majority) held.36 For groups marginalized from the political process
33. See Lawrence Friedman, A History of American Law 403-05 (2d ed. 1985);
Lewis A. Grossman, James Coolidge Carter and Mugwump Jurisprudence, 20 Law &
Hist. Rev. 577, 587 (2002).
34. Friedman, supra note 33, at 393-94, 406-08.
35. Cf Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 Yale L.J. 493
(1996) (book review) (discussing early twentieth century progressive legal theorists'
confidence in legislative competence and distrust of courts).
36. Rhode is right to point out that the middle class has much to gain from
reforms in access to justice today, and they are surely more politically powerful than
2004]
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today, the courts at least provide a forum in which one has a right to
be heard-a forum in which oppressive legislative and executive
action can be challenged.37
Third, both historical and sociological accounts often give the rise of
the American legal profession an air of inevitability by suggesting that
lawyers became increasingly necessary as social action (particularly
economic social action) became more complex.38 According to this
"complexity thesis," some form of dependence on professional
expertise in law was, and by implication is now, inevitable. Perhaps
this is the underlying reason why the codification movement failed.
Opposition from the bar was palpable, but in an age of transition
between the intimacy and simplicity of primarily rural, agrarian social
action, on the one hand, and the complexity of urban, industrial, mass
society, on the other, perhaps too much was in flux for reduction to
code; perhaps too many conflicts, opportunities, and risks were
present to make do without specialized, expert advice. The bar
thrived in the antebellum period, after all, even in the absence of
meaningful controls on admission and unauthorized practice, so it is
fair to conclude that lawyers were at least meeting perceived social
needs.
There is surely some truth to the complexity thesis. Specialization is
an efficient response to market growth and specialized advice about
new, complex transactions is more likely to be competent than a
generalist's guess. The corporate form, commerce, business finance,
real estate development, labor relations, and countless other areas of
economic action grew more sophisticated as the nation moved toward
an industrial economy. It took until well into the twentieth century
for the legal profession to develop firm, legally enforceable
protections for its monopoly on providing legal advice. But the
possibility of competitive lay practice (if not competition from other
low-income groups, but misperceptions forestall the momentum necessary for reform.
See Rhode, supra note 1, at 1.
37. With what degree of success remains open to doubt. Gerald N. Rosenberg,
The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (1991); Patricia J.
Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights (1991) (discussing critical legal studies
critique of rights).
38. See David Dudley Field, supra note 7, at 486.
As the relations of men multiply, the rules which regulate them multiply
also. These relations increase with the increase of population, property,
commerce, and the arts.... And when [the rules] became too many and too
complex to be understood by all the people, a separate class was
indispensable, who should devote themselves to the study, and on whom
should devolve the interpretation and application of these rules.
Id.; see also Friedman, supra note 33, at 411; James Willard Hurst, The Growth of
American Law: The Law Makers (1950); Gordon, supra note 27, at 83 (noting that
legal complexity was part of the stock defense of common law adjudication offered by
antebellum Whig-Federalists).
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experts) was likely diminishing just as the codification movement
became salient in nineteenth century politics.
Still, the complexity thesis can be overstated or, even worse,
converted from descriptive generalization into normative prescription,
especially in the hands of bar associations keen on protecting lawyers'
monopoly rents from the competition lay practitioners would offer.39
As Professor Rhode powerfully contends, there are numerous areas in
which law and the process for enforcing legal rights can be simplified
for low- and middle-income people, however inexorably complex
other fields may be.4" Proponents of codification were also keenly
aware of the opportunities for simplification and we owe some of the
most significant advances in modern civil procedure to their work.41
It is less often considered that the complexity of social oppression of
low-income groups may have outstripped the remedial capacity of
law. If this is so, one wonders how fruitful efforts to simplify law and
expand access to legal services will be. One of the core attributes of
the full-blown adversarial process is its capacity for highly
individuated rights definition, rights application, and rights
enforcement. Simplification through forms, easy access web filing,
"rocket docket" case management, high-volume courts of special
jurisdiction, and routinized, mass produced, market-driven legal
services risk diminishing this individualized review-reducing law to
commodity form, clients to mere consumers, and rights application to
mere rubber stamping.42 On the other hand, even in full adversary
adjudication, rights definition and enforcement have proven to be
limited tools for rectifying sustained group-based harms such as
discrimination and class subordination. Perhaps law can only reach so
far into the machinery of political, cultural, and economic
marginalization. The problem is not merely the inherent conservatism
of rights definition, but the stark difference in the way legal rights and
other forms of social power operate. Even if the Supreme Court is
correct that the "right to sue and defend" is "conservative of all other
39. Whether the market always creates sufficient incentives for competence, I
leave to another day.
40. See Rhode, supra note 1, at 185-94.
41. See Friedman, supra note 33 (discussing the impact of the merger of law and
equity in the Field Code).
42. Even alternatives to litigation explicitly designed to be informal, claimant-
friendly, and non-adversarial can become confusing, frustrating, and rights-defeating
in the absence of legal assistance to ensure that decision makers are presented with
the right facts and arguments. Consider, for instance, the experience of veterans
seeking benefits for service-related disabilities from the Veterans' Administration.
See Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985). There is also
the problem of the visibility of rights definition and enforcement when secret
settlements and private dispute resolution replace public litigation. And it is telling
that the class action-a procedural tool that, as Professor Rhode observes, can be
distinctly insensitive to individual rights-has become one of the most effective tools
for protecting consumers. See Rhode, supra note 1, at 34-35.
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rights, and lies at the foundation of orderly government,"43 rights and
lawyers to enforce them may not be sufficient to check social forces
that can subvert rights or operate beyond the remedial power of
courts.
Notwithstanding these lingering concerns, Professor Rhode's book
shows that the importance of access to legal services cannot be
gainsaid. Imbalances in access to legal services exacerbate the
problem of marginalization for low-income groups and limit the
opportunities of the middle class. The cases that opened the door of
the Warren Court's due process revolution amply illustrate the impact
legal representation can have in the lives of low- and middle-income
people."
II. LOCATING PROFESSIONAL FAILURE
Access to Justice demonstrates that there is plenty of blame to go
around for the maldistribution of legal services. Bar associations have
behaved more like rent-seeking interest groups than the self-policing,
public-minded regulatory bodies they purport to be; state legislatures
and state supreme courts have too long caved to patently self-serving
claims by bar associations for insulation from direct public regulation;
Congress has abandoned its commitment to meaningful publicly
subsidized legal services (not only by cutting funding but by restricting
the attorney-client relationship to prevent significant challenges to the
status quo); and individual lawyers have, for the most part, utterly
failed to meet even the rather modest voluntary standards set out by
the ABA and state bar associations for pro bono work."
The most significant failure, however, has been in the judiciary. No
other group touching the administration of justice possesses the
authority, responsibility, information, and opportunity to impose
effective remedies. The inherent powers doctrine provides ample
43. Rhode, supra note 1, at 9 (internal quotations omitted).
44. See, e.g., Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
45. Rule 6.1 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides in part
that
A lawyer should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico
legal services per year. In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should: (a)
provide a substantial majority of the (50) hours of legal services without fee
or expectation of fee to: (1) persons of limited means or (2) [organizations]
in matters that are designed primarily to address the needs of persons of
limited means.
Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 6.1 (2003). But as Professor Rhode has shown,
[m]ost lawyers make no [pro bono] contributions, and the average for the
bar as a whole is less than half an hour a week and fifty cents a day.
Moreover, much of what passes for 'pro bono' is not aid to the indigent or
public interest causes, but either favors for friends, family, or clients, or cases
where fees turn out to be uncollectible.
Rhode, supra note 1, at 145.
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authority for judges to insist upon adequate representation for all
parties appearing in court, if not for parties outside the litigation
process. The Due Process Clause and ethical codes make clear that
judges have a solemn obligation to protect the administration of
justice. They are its stewards. Judges, particularly at the trial level,
are also better situated than anyone else to know when counsel is
needed.
Judges are pillars of the profession in their communities, both
symbolically and practically. If they have failed to make access to
legal services a priority, is it any surprise that lawyers, legislators, and
bar associations have been equally indifferent? Conversely, if judges
made access a priority, it's hard to imagine successful, sustained
resistance from other quarters in the profession. Professor Rhode
rightly points out that, at the state level, where many judges must run
for office, political pressures undermine judicial independence.46
Popular election of judges is, interestingly, another holdover from
radical democratic antebellum politics-a result of the same
nineteenth century egalitarian movement that pressed for
codification. Now, however, popular election tends to invite the worst
forms of political dependence. Campaign finance reform would
mitigate the problem, but indifference to the needs of low- and
middle-income litigants is also severe at the federal level, where
political dependence is not an issue. This suggests that there are more
fundamental forces at play in judicial failure.
Crushing caseloads undoubtedly prevent many judges from even
considering the issue of access, let alone dedicating time to imagining
solutions.47 Others likely take the Supreme Court's woefully narrow
definition of the constitutional minimum of due process as both floor
and ceiling, reasoning that where there is no affirmative right to
counsel, no superior ethical obligation requires them to ensure that
litigants have lawyers, or, in criminal cases, that they need expect no
more from lawyers appearing in their courtrooms than what the
Supreme Court declares to be minimally competent performance.48
Still others may feel that lawyers are part of the problem with the
adversary system, not a solution.49 That may very well be true in
46. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 1, at 128, 132.
47. See, e.g., id. at 84 ("Judges often lack the time, expertise, or inclination to
assist.., pro se litigants. Over 90 percent of surveyed courts have no established
policies concerning individuals who represent themselves."); id. at 132 (discussing
courts' "already unmanageable dockets").
48. See id. at 9 (discussing Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Serv.); id. at 131-37 (discussing
the constitutional standard for ineffective assistance of counsel in criminal cases and
the low regulatory standards for managing publicly subsidized criminal defense work);
see also id. at 56.
49. See Chief Justice Rehnquist's critique of lawyers in Walters v. National Ass'n
of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 325 (1985) ("'Under our adversary system the
role of counsel is not to make sure that truth is ascertained but to advance his client's
cause by any ethical means. Within the limits of professional propriety, causing delay
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certain areas, but in cases where those who can afford to hire counsel
regularly do so, it's difficult to find convincing arguments that low-
and middle-income litigants deserve less, especially when substantial
rights are at stake.
All of this is just to say that I hope Access to Justice finds its way
into judges' chambers. If reform is to come from within, if law is to be
more than a luxury, judges must lead the way.
and sowing confusion not only are his right but may be his duty."') (quoting Henry J.
Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1287-90 (1975)). And as
Professor Rhode shows, judges can be equally hostile to pro se litigants as well. See
Rhode, supra note 1, at 85.
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